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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ALLISON BARTON and JANA
12 MORENO, individually and on behalf of
13 others similarly situated,
14 Plaintiffs,
15 v.
16 THE PROCTER & GAMBLE
17 COMPANY, a Delaware company,
18 Defendant.

Case No. 3:24-CV-01332-GPC-SBC

**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART MOTION TO
DISMISS**

[ECF No. 15]

19 Plaintiffs brought several consumer protection claims against Defendant for
20 allegedly misleading consumers about the presence of lead in Defendant's tampon
21 products.

22 Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. ECF No. 15.
23 Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and Defendant filed a reply. ECF Nos. 20, 21. Based on
24 the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion
25 to dismiss.
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BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Allison Barton and Jana Moreno (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) have sued Defendant The Procter & Gamble Company (“Defendant”) for allegedly violating California consumer protection law regarding its Tampax Pearl tampons and Tampax Radiant tampons (collectively the “Products”). ECF No. 10, First Amended Complaint (“Complaint” or “FAC”) ¶¶ 1, 118, 121. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed to disclose, and materially omitted, that these Products contain lead. FAC ¶ 1.

A. Lead in tampons

According to Plaintiffs, the World Health Organization states that “[t]here is no level of exposure to lead that is known to be without harmful effects” and that “[e]xposure to lead “can affect multiple body systems and is particularly harmful to young children and women of child-bearing age.” FAC ¶¶ 7, 34. Citing to an article published in a scientific toxicology journal, Plaintiffs allege that lead can lead to “severe health risks and toxicity, including inhibiting neurological function, anemia, kidney damage, seizures, and in extreme cases, coma and death.” *Id.* ¶ 25.

The Complaint states that California’s Proposition 65 establishes a Maximum Allowable Dose Level (“MADL”) of 0.5 micrograms of lead per day for reproductive toxicity. *Id.* ¶ 35. Based on “independent scientific testing and analysis of the Products,” the ordinary and expected use of the Products would allegedly expose consumers to more than this MADL per day. *Id.* ¶ 3. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that their independent laboratory testing shows that Tampax Pearl Products contain .181 micrograms of lead per gram, and that Tampax Radiant Products contain .123 micrograms of lead per gram. *Id.* ¶¶ 36, 37. The testing was done on the super versions of these two Product lines. *Id.* at ¶ 36 n.13, ¶ 37, n.14. Products are sold in varying sizes, with different gram weights, and Plaintiffs have extrapolated the testing results from the super Products to the light and regular Products. *See id.* Plaintiffs allege that,

1 based on the daily average use of tampons, consumers are exposed to lead in excess of
2 the MADL, regardless of what size Product they use. *Id.* ¶¶ 38, 39; *see id.* ¶¶ 45-82
3 (detailing how typical use of each Product, regardless of size, would expose consumers to
4 a level of lead that exceeds the MADL).

5 Plaintiffs allege that this exposure to lead is “particularly detrimental” because the
6 Products are “inserted vaginally where the lead can be directly absorbed into the blood
7 stream.” *Id.* ¶¶ 26-33 (detailing how toxins can enter the blood stream directly through
8 vaginal administration).

9 **B. Alleged misrepresentations and omissions**

10 According to Plaintiffs, the Products contain the following prominent messaging
11 (“Representations”) on their boxes: (i) “#1 U.S. GYNECOLOGIST RECOMMENDED
12 TAMPON BRAND”; (ii) “FREE OF PERFUME”; (iii) “FREE OF ELEMENTAL
13 CHLORINE BLEACHING”; (iv) “TAMPON FREE OF DYES”; and (v)
14 “CLINICALLY TESTED GENTLE TO SKIN.” *Id.* ¶ 112.

15 Plaintiffs allege that these Representations mislead reasonable consumers to
16 believe that the Products are safe to use, including that “they are free from potentially
17 harmful elements and ingredients.” *Id.* ¶ 113. According to Plaintiffs, a reasonable
18 consumer could believe, based on these Representations, that the Products would be free
19 from lead. *Id.* ¶¶ 18-20.

20 Plaintiffs allege that these Representations and the failure to disclose the presence
21 of lead in Defendant’s Products constitute a violation of California consumer protection
22 law. *Id.* ¶ 92. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant knew, or should have known, that the
23 Products contained lead and either willfully or intentionally failed to disclose this fact to
24 consumers. *Id.* ¶ 101. Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant owed consumers a duty of
25 care to adequately test its Products for heavy metals and if found, to remediate or disclose
26 their presence. *Id.* ¶ 102.

Plaintiff Barton bought Tampax Pearl products in light, regular, and super sizes on numerous occasions. *Id.* ¶ 130. Plaintiff Moreno bought Tampax Radiant products in the regular size on numerous occasions. *Id.* ¶ 146. They purchased these Products without knowing that the Products contained lead, but would not have bought them if they had known of the true contents. *Id.* ¶¶ 21, 109, 130, 146. They had relied on the Representations in believing the Products to be free from harmful effects and safe to use. *Id.* ¶¶ 137, 152. Since consumers were “deprived of making the informed choice between the Products and other menstrual products [that do not contain lead],” Plaintiffs allege that they and other consumers have suffered economic injury based on the purchase price of the Products. *Id.* ¶¶ 107, 108.

Plaintiffs continue to suffer harm because they cannot rely on the labeling of the Products and are unable to determine whether to buy them in the future, even though they would like to purchase them if they do not contain lead. *Id.* ¶¶ 143, 158. Unless Defendant is enjoined from failing to disclose the presence of lead in the future, Plaintiffs will not be able to determine if there is lead or not in the Products. *Id.* ¶¶ 144, 159. Thus, Plaintiffs allege that the legal remedies are inadequate to prevent future injuries. *Id.* ¶¶ 145, 160.

Plaintiffs seek to represent a Class against Defendant for violations of state consumer protection law: (1) Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business & Professions Code sections 17200 *et seq.*; (2) False Advertising Law (“FAL”), California Business & Professions Code sections 17500 *et seq.*; and (3) Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), California Civil Code sections 1750 *et seq.* *Id.* at 22-28.

Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint on various grounds. ECF No. 15 (“Mot.”). For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part this motion to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. *See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990); *Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain a “short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), backed by sufficient facts that make the claim “plausible on its face,” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, it requires enough factual content for the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Id.* (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556).

In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” *Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But courts do not accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. *In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig.*, 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, the court must be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 663.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)

Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires a plaintiff bringing such a claim to

1 “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
2 9(b). The circumstances required by Rule 9(b) are the “who, what, when, where, and
3 how” of the fraudulent activity. *Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.*, 637 F.3d 1047,
4 1055 (9th Cir. 2011). In addition, the allegation “must set forth what is false or
5 misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” *Id.* The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to
6 require that allegations be “specific enough to give defendants notice of the particular
7 misconduct which is alleged ... so that they can defend against the charge and not just
8 deny that they have done anything wrong.” *Swartz v. KPMG LLP*, 476 F.3d 756, 764
9 (9th Cir. 2007).

10 **C. Leave to amend**

11 When a court dismisses a complaint, it “should grant leave to amend... unless it
12 determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.”
13 *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The court considers factors such as
14 “the presence or absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to
15 cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party[,] and
16 futility of the proposed amendment.” *See Moore v. Kayport Package Express*, 885 F.2d
17 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Dismissal
18 without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved
19 by any amendment.” *Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc.*, 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th
20 Cir. 2007).

21 **DISCUSSION**

22 **A. Judicial notice**

23 Generally, on a motion to dismiss, courts will limit their review to the contents of
24 the complaint and may only consider extrinsic evidence that is properly presented as part
25 of the complaint. *See Lee v. City of L.A.*, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
26 However, under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, courts can consider documents
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1 that were not attached to a pleading. *See Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A.*, 691 F.3d 1152,
2 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). And under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a
3 district court may take notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are capable of
4 accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
5 be questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

6 Defendant seeks incorporation-by-reference or judicial notice of four exhibits: a
7 copy of the article cited in paragraph 25, footnote 4 of the Complaint (Ex. 1); a copy of
8 the article cited in paragraph 27, footnote 5 of the Complaint (Ex. 2); a copy of the
9 announcement published by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) regarding
10 the agency’s investigation of lead in tampons (Ex. 3); and a copy of information
11 regarding the MADL for Ethyl Dipropylthiocarbamate published by the California Office
12 of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (Ex. 4). ECF No. 16 (Request for Judicial
13 Notice) at 2-4.

14 The Court incorporates by reference Exhibits 1 and 2 because they are relevant to
15 the instant case, neither party questions their authenticity, and Plaintiffs’ Complaint
16 references and relies on these articles to support its allegations. *See* FAC ¶¶ 25, 27.

17 The Court takes judicial notice of Exhibit 3 because it is a webpage published by
18 the government that is relevant to the issues at hand, and neither party disputes its
19 authenticity. *See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n*, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir.
20 2010). But the Court will not take judicial notice of the truth of any disputed facts
21 contained in this exhibit. *See Lee*, 250 F.3d at 689.

22 As to Exhibit 4, the toxicity of ethyl dipropylthiocarbamate is not at issue in the
23 case and Defendant has not demonstrated that its MADL is relevant. The Court therefore
24 does not judicially notice this document. *See Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria*, 160 F.3d 543,
25 548 n.13 (9th Cir. 1998) (judicial notice inappropriate where facts to be noticed are
26 irrelevant to disposition of issues before the court).

1 Defendant submitted a Notice of Supplemental Authority with two exhibits
2 attached: the FDA’s announcement on December 23, 2024 that it had completed the
3 literature review portion of its investigation into tampons (Exhibit A) and the actual
4 report containing the literature review (Exhibit B). ECF No. 28. The Court takes judicial
5 notice of the Notice of Supplemental Authority, Exhibits A and B because both are
6 “made publicly available by government entities” and “neither party disputes the
7 authenticity of the web sites or the accuracy of the information displayed therein.”
8 *Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n*, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010).

9 **B. Primary jurisdiction**

10 In June 2024, researchers published a study which found “measurable
11 concentrations” of lead “in 30 tampons produced by 14 tampon brand manufacturers.
12 Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 2 at 2, Environmental International 190 (2024) 108849,
13 Tampons as a source of exposure to metal(oids)s, Jenni A. Shearson, et al. The study’s
14 conclusion observed that “[f]uture research is necessary to replicate our findings and
15 determine whether metals can leach out of tampons and cross the vaginal epithelium into
16 systemic circulation.” *Id.* at 9. In response, on September 10, 2024, the FDA announced
17 that it commissioned an independent literature review and initiated an internal bench
18 laboratory study to determine if metals from tampons are released and if they are
19 absorbed by the body. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 3, Biocompatibility and
20 Toxicology Program: Research on Medical Devices, Biocompatibility, and Toxicology.
21 The study will, among other things, measure the amount of metals that come out of
22 tampons under conditions that more closely mimic normal use.

23 On December 23, 2024, the FDA announced that it had completed the literature
24 review portion of its investigation and that “the findings did not identify safety concerns
25 associated with tampon use and contaminant exposure.” Notice of Supplemental
26 Authority, Exhibit A, at 1. Despite the “limitations related to the methods used in the
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1 [reviewed] studies” and the fact that none of the studies actually addressed “how much, if
2 any, of the contaminants identified are released from the tampon or absorbed through the
3 vagina,” the FDA stated that it “continues to recommend FDA-cleared tampons as a safe
4 option for use as a menstrual product.” *Id.*

5 Based upon the completed literature review and the pending laboratory study,
6 Defendant, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, moves the Court to dismiss the
7 Complaint or, in the alternative, stay the proceedings, in order to permit the FDA to
8 complete its risk assessment study and report their findings. ECF No. 16 at 14-15.

9 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies in a “limited set of circumstances.”
10 *Clark v. Time Warner Cable*, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). It allows courts, in
11 their discretion, to stay proceedings, or dismiss a complaint without prejudice, until the
12 “resolution of an issue within the special competence of an administrative agency.” *Id.*
13 The policy behind the doctrine is prudential: it applies if the court determines that “an
14 otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and policy questions that should be
15 addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory authority over the relevant
16 industry rather than by the judicial branch.” *Id.*

17 Courts, in determining whether to invoke the doctrine, look at “(1) the need to
18 resolve an issue that (2) has been placed by Congress within the jurisdiction of an
19 administrative body having regulatory authority (3) pursuant to a statute that subjects an
20 industry or activity to a comprehensive regulatory scheme that (4) requires expertise or
21 uniformity in administration.” *Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc.*, 307
22 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “must also consider whether invoking primary
23 jurisdiction would needlessly delay the resolution of claims” because in the Ninth Circuit,
24 “efficiency is the deciding factor in whether to invoke primary jurisdiction.” *Astiana v.*
25 *Hain Celestial Grp.*, 783 F.3d 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2015).

1 In particular, at the motion to dismiss stage, courts must “apply a standard derived
2 from Rule 12(b)(6) jurisprudence: whether the complaint plausibly asserts a claim that
3 would *not* implicate the [primary jurisdiction] doctrine.” *Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Astra*
4 *U.S.*, 588 F.3d 1237, 1251–52 (9th Cir. 2009), *rev’d on other grounds*, 563 U.S. 110 (not
5 invoking primary jurisdiction where, without the agency's expertise, the court could
6 plausibly adjudicate the action) (emphasis in original).

7 Defendant argues that because the FDA is “actively investigating” the concern at
8 the heart of the lawsuit (i.e., what health risks, if any, exist from the potential presence of
9 heavy metals like lead in tampons), the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies. *See* Mot.
10 at 6.

11 It is true that the FDA regulates tampons as Class II medical devices. *See* 21
12 C.F.R. §§ 884.5460, 884.5470. And mere months after Plaintiffs filed their Complaint,
13 the FDA indicated that it was “aware of concerns about tampon safety after a 2024 study
14 found metals in tampons during laboratory testing.” Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 3.
15 The FDA emphasized that this June 2024 study “did not test whether metals are released
16 from tampons when used” and did not test for metals being “absorbed into the vaginal
17 lining.” *Id.* The FDA later completed its literature review of nine published studies and
18 announced that its laboratory study was underway to determine if tampons release the
19 metals they contain and whether these metals are vaginally absorbed. Notice of
20 Supplemental Authority, Exhibit A. Based on all this, Defendant argues that the Court
21 should invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

22 Ultimately, in considering primary jurisdiction, the Court focuses on the specific
23 issues raised by the claims. Although the FDA has a history of regulating tampons, the
24 primary jurisdiction doctrine does not “require[] that all claims within an agency's
25 purview... be decided by the agency.” *Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc.*,
26 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002). In exercising its discretion, the Court considers
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1 whether the issues raised in the instant case line up with the expertise of the FDA and
2 their ability to resolve the issues before the Court. Here, Plaintiffs are proceeding on two
3 theories. First, they claim that Defendant made misrepresentations in the Product's
4 packaging and that a reasonable consumer would be deceived by those
5 misrepresentations. Second, Plaintiffs are asserting a fraudulent omission theory that
6 requires a showing of an unreasonable safety hazard.

7 As to the misrepresentation theory, Plaintiffs argue that Products and their
8 Representations are *misleading*, which is “not a technical area in which the FDA [has]
9 greater technical expertise than the courts.” *Lockwood v. Conagra Foods, Inc.*, 597 F.
10 Supp. 2d 1028, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009); *see Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.*, 912 F. Supp.
11 2d 889, 899 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“allegations of deceptive labeling do not require the
12 expertise of the FDA to be resolved in the courts, as every day courts decide whether
13 conduct is misleading”). The FDA’s literature review did not, and the FDA’s laboratory
14 study will not, review affirmative representations such as those on the Product packaging
15 and determine whether they were misleading when Defendant omitted the presence of
16 lead in the tampons. This issue “do[es] not clearly require the FDA's expertise or benefit
17 from uniformity in administration.” *Sciortino v. Pepsico, Inc.*, 108 F. Supp. 3d 780, 814
18 (N.D. Cal. 2015). As such, the FDA decision will not resolve the issue raised in the
19 misrepresentation claim and primary jurisdiction does not apply to it. *See In re Trader*
20 *Joe's Co. Dark Chocolate Litig.*, 2024 WL 1319725, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2024)
21 (“[c]ases concerning dark chocolate bar labeling may be on the rise of late, but cases
22 challenging food product labels are not an issue of first impression”).

23 As to the unreasonable safety risk that makes up part of the fraudulent omission
24 claim, the July 2024 study observes that “no previous studies have measured metals in
25 tampons,” Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 2 at 1. While there is no question that vaginal
26 walls are permeable and permit direct access to networks of blood vessels, it is currently
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1 unknown whether the lead in tampons leeches out of the product and enters the
2 circulatory system. The questions of whether lead is released from tampons, enters a
3 woman's circulatory system and creates an unreasonable safety risk are issues of "first
4 impression." These issues are within the jurisdiction of the FDA and would benefit from
5 the FDA's expertise in determining the safety of consumer products.

6 However, there is no indication that the FDA will provide an opinion as to an
7 unreasonable safety risk created by any particular tampon, let alone for Defendant's
8 Product. In addition, Defendant does not address the delay that would likely result if this
9 case were stayed until the FDA issued guidance. The FDA only stated that it would
10 publicly communicate its laboratory findings after peer review; it gave no indication or
11 timeline of when that would be. *See* Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 3. "[P]rimary
12 jurisdiction is not required when a referral to the agency would significantly postpone a
13 ruling that a court is otherwise competent to make." *Astiana*, 783 F.3d at 761. Waiting
14 for this guidance may simply delay Plaintiffs' claims with no actual pay-off in the end.
15 *See In re Plum Baby Food Litig.*, 2022 WL 16640802, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022)
16 ("[U]ncertainty over how and when the FDA will act counsels against an indefinite
17 stay.") Finally, given that there is no basis to stay the misrepresentation claim, it would
18 be inefficient for the Court to sever the safety issues related to the fraudulent omission
19 claim, and, as stated earlier, "efficiency is the deciding factor in whether to invoke
20 primary jurisdiction." *Astiana*, 783 F.3d at 760.

21 Accordingly, the Court declines to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to
22 either theory of liability. Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims on this basis is
23 denied.

24 **C. Sufficient pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)**

25 Because Plaintiffs' claims "sound in fraud," they must satisfy the heightened
26 pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). *Kearns v. Ford Motor Co.*, 567 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th
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1 Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has held that a claim is “grounded in fraud” for the
2 purposes of Rule 9(b) where “the plaintiff [] allege[s] a unified course of fraudulent
3 conduct and rel[ies] entirely on that course of conduct as the basis of a claim.” *Vess v.*
4 *Ciba–Geigy Corp. USA*, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must allege
5 with particularity the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the misconduct charged, so
6 that defendants have notice and can defend against the particular misconduct. *See*
7 *Kearns*, 567 F.3d at 1124. The complaint must also state “what is false or misleading
8 about a statement, and why it is false.” *In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 42 F.3d 1541,
9 1548 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), *superseded by statute on other grounds*, Private Sec.
10 Litig. Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).

11 Here, Plaintiffs’ FAC claims rely entirely on the same course of alleged fraudulent
12 conduct: Defendant’s misrepresentations that their products are safe when they contain
13 lead in such quantities that create an unreasonable safety hazard. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
14 claims are subject to Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement. *See, e.g., Loh v.*
15 *Future Motion, Inc.*, No. 21-cv-06088-EJD, 2022 WL 2668380, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 11,
16 2022) (“each claim is subject to the requirements of Rule 9(b),” including claims for
17 CLRA and unjust enrichment).

18 Defendant argues that “there are no details about *how many* products were tested,
19 *how* the products were tested, *who* conducted the testing, or *when* the tests occurred.”
20 Mot. at 11. Defendant also asserts that the Complaint does not allege with specificity
21 *why* Plaintiffs believe that the products they purchased contained lead. Mot. at 9.
22 In other words, “how” and “why” the representations are false.

23 Plaintiffs allege that they bought specific Products produced by the Defendant, at a
24 specific time and stores, labeled with specific Representations, and that they believed the
25 Products to be lead-free when they were not. However, Plaintiffs are also required to
26 address “what is false or misleading about [the] statement, and why it is false.” *In re*
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1 *GlenFed*, 42 F.3d at 1548. As to the “what,” Plaintiffs adequately allege that the
2 packaging representations communicate to the consumer that the product is free of
3 ingredients that are harmful, which is false because the tampons contain lead. But, as to
4 “why” and “how” the statement is false, this question does implicate the testing
5 performed because the misrepresentations can only be false if there are facts supporting
6 the presence of lead in the Products purchased by the Plaintiffs. Defendant argues that
7 these testing allegations fail to provide the details regarding the method of testing and
8 why testing results of a single type of tampon (super) can be extrapolated to the entirety
9 of the Pearl and Radiant line. Mot. at 18.

10 Here, Plaintiff Barton alleges she purchased Tampax Pearl Products during the
11 class period in the following sizes: light, regular and super. FAC ¶ 130. Plaintiff Moreno
12 alleges she purchased Tampax Radiant Products during the class period in the regular
13 size. FAC ¶ 146. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs rely on unidentified independent testing
14 which produced reported results for the super Tampax Pearl and super Tampax Radiant
15 products. FAC ¶ 36, n. 13, ¶ 37, n.14. The testing fails to analyze the light and regular
16 Pearl and Radiant Products purchased and, instead, Plaintiffs rely on extrapolation from
17 the super-size Products without any explanation as to why extrapolation is appropriate.
18 The lack of testing of the light and regular sized Products and the failure to provide
19 support for extrapolation is made more salient given that the Complaint also alleges that
20 Tampax pure cotton tampons were tested and contained such a small amount of lead (if
21 any) that the lead is below the limit of detection. FAC ¶¶ 83-85.

22 While a plaintiff is not required to prove the merits of their case at the pleading
23 stage, *see OSU Student Alliance v. Ray*, 699 F.3d 1053, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012) (“plaintiff’s
24 failure to prove the case on the pleadings does not warrant dismissal”), more than a
25 conclusory claim that the product contains a harmful substance is required, *Starr v. Baca*,
26 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“allegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not
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1 simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of
2 underlying facts to give fair notice”). To plausibly allege a presence of harmful
3 substance claim, Plaintiffs are required to allege facts that testing disclosed presence of
4 such substances in the accused product purchased. *See Lowe v. Edgewell Pers. Care Co.*,
5 711 F. Supp. 3d 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2024); *Krystofiak v. BellRing Brands, Inc.*, 2024 WL
6 3012801, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2024); *Hamman v. Cava Grp., Inc.*, No. 22-CV-593-
7 MMA (MSB), 2023 WL 3450654, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023) (allegations relied on
8 Consumer Reports article, similar studies and reports, and Plaintiff’s own tests that the
9 Products are likely to contain PFAS). Extrapolation of test results can be applied broadly
10 where supported by factual allegations. *Cf. Onaka v. Shisheido Americas Corp.*, 2023
11 WL 2663877, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2023).

12 The Court concludes that the FAC allegations as to the presence of lead fail to
13 provide sufficient detail regarding the testing. The FAC merely alleges that independent
14 laboratory testing and analysis detected .181 mcg of lead per gram of Product for Tampax
15 Pearl Products and .123 mcg of lead per gram of Product for Tampax Radiant Products.
16 The FAC provides no further information as to the laboratory that performed the testing
17 or the form and date of testing. Further, to the extent that Plaintiffs have failed to test the
18 light and regular Products purchased by the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are required to either test
19 these Products or explain why extrapolation of the super Pearl and Radiant results is
20 appropriate.

21 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ claims fail to meet the heightened pleading
22 standard of Rule 9(b). Because the deficiencies are ones that Plaintiffs can correct, the
23 Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss without prejudice and provides leave to amend the
24 Complaint.

25 **D. Proposition 65**

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1 Defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed as an impermissible
2 attempt to bring a “back-door Proposition 65 claim.” Mot. at 11. Under Proposition 65,
3 no person doing business shall “knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a
4 chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving
5 clear and reasonable warning to such individual” where the amount exceeds the “no
6 significant risk level” established by the California Environmental Protection Agency’s
7 Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. *Sciortino*, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 787
8 (citing Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 25249.6).

9 Private parties may sue to enforce Proposition 65, but the plaintiff must first wait
10 60 days after she gives “notice of an alleged violation” to the “alleged violator,” the
11 California Attorney General, and local prosecutors. Cal. Health & Saf. Code §
12 25249.7(d). Pursuant to an amendment that took effect in 2002, the notice must also
13 include a “certificate of merit” that states that the “person executing the certificate has
14 consulted with one or more persons with relevant and appropriate experience or
15 expertise... and that, based on that information, the person executing the certificate
16 believes there is a reasonable and meritorious case for the private action.” *See Sciortino*,
17 108 F. Supp. 3d at 788 (citing *DiPirro v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc.*, 119 Cal. App. 4th 966,
18 970 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 25249.7(d)(1)).

19 The policy behind these pre-suit requirements is to encourage public enforcement
20 and settlement, and to deter frivolous private lawsuits. *See Sciortino*, 108 F. Supp. 3d at
21 788 (detailing the policy justifications behind Proposition 65’s pre-suit requirements). To
22 that end, California courts strictly enforce the notice requirements and hold that pre-filing
23 notice is mandatory, and that defective notice cannot be cured retroactively. *Id.*
24 (discussing *DiPirro* and *In re Vaccine Cases*, 134 Cal. App. 4th 438 (Cal Ct. App.
25 2005)). The courts in *DiPirro* and *In re Vaccine Cases* dismissed the complaints with
26 prejudice because allowing retroactive cure “would reduce the effectiveness of
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1 prelitigation efforts by the Attorney General to discourage filing the frivolous suit in the
2 first place.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

3 These pre-suit requirements apply not only to actions explicitly brought under
4 Proposition 65, but to “camouflaged suits” that enforce Proposition 65’s strictures under
5 other laws. *Rodriguez v. Equal Exchange, Inc.*, 2024 WL 1421971, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar.
6 31, 2024). In other words, a plaintiff cannot skirt these requirements by bringing claims
7 – under consumer protection statutes – that would otherwise “be barred under Proposition
8 65.” *Harris v. RJ Reynolds*, 2016 WL 6246415, at *2 (N.D. Cal Sept. 30, 2016) The key
9 question for the Court then becomes whether the claims asserted in the Complaint are
10 “entirely derivative of an unspoken Proposition 65 violation, or whether they assert
11 claims independent of Proposition 65.” *Id.* (citing *Sciortino*, 108 F.Supp. 3d at 792).

12 Here, the claims in the Complaint are *not* entirely derivative of the unspoken
13 Proposition 65 violation (failure-to-warn of lead). Plaintiffs do rest on Proposition 65 as
14 a basis for wrongdoing that gives rise to their UCL claim. *See* FAC ¶ 98 (“Although
15 Plaintiffs do not bring claims pursuant to Proposition 65, Defendant’s violation of
16 Proposition 65 provides a predicate basis for violation of California’s Unfair Competition
17 Law...”). However, Plaintiffs do not merely allege that there was a failure to warn under
18 Proposition 65. Instead, they allege that Defendant “has gone beyond the offenses of
19 omission that Proposition 65 seeks to prevent and has affirmatively deceived its
20 customers.” *Equal Exchange*, 2024 WL 1421971 at *4. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant
21 has actively misled consumers by making Representations on Products that belie the
22 presence of lead. Since this goes beyond a failure-to-warn violation under Proposition
23 65, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs assert claims independent of Proposition 65 and are
24 not subject to the notice requirements.

25 *Sciortino* is instructive. There, the two named plaintiffs asserted claims under the
26 CLRA, UCL, and FAL. Plaintiff Ibusuki alleged that the defendant Pepsi failed to warn
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1 consumers that its product had a Proposition 65-listed chemical. The court found that his
2 claims rose “exclusively from his allegations that Pepsi did not issue the warning
3 required by Proposition 65,” and dismissed his claims. *Sciortino*, 108 F.Supp. 3d at 794.
4 By contrast, the court found that plaintiff Hall’s complaint was “based not literally upon a
5 violation of Proposition 65, but on Pepsi’s public statements which allegedly
6 misrepresented its actions.” *Id.* It was not fatal that the Hall complaint referred to
7 Proposition 65 “repeatedly in support of [Hall’s] claims,” including “as part of her
8 allegations for the predicate wrong in support of her state law claims.” *Id.* at 793-94
9 (citations to complaint omitted). Instead, the court found that “[w]hile the alleged
10 misstatement is *related* to Proposition 65, the alleged wrong is not a failure to warn under
11 Proposition 65, but rather a *separate* misrepresentation to consumers...” *Id.* (emphasis
12 added).

13 Likewise, the alleged wrong here is not simply a failure-to-warn of lead, but a
14 misrepresentation of the Products, given the statements “FREE OF PERFUME,” “FREE
15 OF DYES,” “FREE OF ELEMENTAL CHLORINE BLEACHING,” and
16 “CLINICALLY TESTED GENTLE ON SKIN.” According to Plaintiffs, “The
17 Representations lead reasonable consumers to believe that the Products are safe to use...
18 The Representations are misleading based on the lead contained in the Products.” FAC
19 ¶¶ 113, 114. Because “[a]llegations of misleading statements and affirmative
20 misrepresentations fall outside Proposition 65’s ambit,” Plaintiffs may proceed with their
21 consumer protection claims, notwithstanding the Proposition 65 notice requirements.
22 *Equal Exchange*, 2024 WL 1421971 at *4 (internal quotations omitted).

23 **E. UCL, FAL and CLRA**

24 Assuming Plaintiffs’ FAC satisfies Rule 9(b), the Court will further analyze
25 Plaintiffs’ UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims based on Defendant’s alleged fraudulent
26 omissions and misrepresentations. The UCL prohibits business practices that are
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1 “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 17200; the FAL prohibits the
2 dissemination of any advertising “which is untrue or misleading,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
3 § 17500; and the CLRA proscribes specific acts and practices in the sale of goods or
4 services to be unlawful, including making affirmative misrepresentations or omissions
5 regarding the “standard, quality or grade” of a particular good or service, Cal. Civ. Code
6 § 1770(a).

7 Here, Plaintiffs’ UCL, FAL and CLRA claims are premised on a theory of
8 misrepresentation that the Representations on the labels of the Products mislead
9 consumers to believe that the tampons are free of any “potentially harmful elements,”
10 including lead, FAC ¶¶ 113, 114, and a material omission theory, alleging that Defendant
11 failed to inform consumers that the tampons contain lead. FAC ¶¶ 139, 154.

12 1. Actionable misrepresentation

13 To plausibly allege a UCL, FAL or CLRA claim based upon misrepresentation,
14 Plaintiffs “must allege that they relied on a misrepresentation and suffered injury as a
15 result.” *Mirkin v. Wasserman*, 5 Cal. 4th 1082, 1092 (1993). Claims under these statutes
16 are governed by the “reasonable consumer” standard, which means that plaintiffs must
17 “show that members of the public are likely to be deceived” by the defendant’s marketing
18 claims. *Whiteside v. Kimberly Clark Corp.*, 108 F.4th 771, 777 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting
19 *Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co.*, 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008)). These claims can be
20 false, *or* true but “either actually misleading... or has a capacity, likelihood, or tendency
21 to deceive or confuse the public.” *Salazar v. Walmart, Inc.*, 83 Cal. App. 5th 561, 566
22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022). This “reasonable consumer” standard requires “more than a mere
23 possibility” that a defendant’s statements “might conceivably be misunderstood by some
24 few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” *Ebner v. Fresh, Inc.*, 838 F.3d
25 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing *Lavie v. Proctor & Gamble Co.*, 105 Cal. App. 4th 496,
26 508 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). Instead, the standard requires a probability “that a significant
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1 portion of the general consuming public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in
2 the circumstances, could be misled.” *Id.* (citation omitted). The standard is “evaluated
3 from the perspective of ‘the ordinary consumer’...who is not typically ‘exceptionally
4 acute [or] sophisticated’...” *Souter v. Edgewell Pers. Care Co.*, 2023 WL 5011747, at *1
5 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2023). Product labels should not be “read in the abstract,” *Andrade-*
6 *Heymsfield v. NextFoods, Inc.*, No. 21-cv-1446-BTM-MSB, 2023 WL 2576770, at *3
7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2023), but in the context of the entire packaging messaging.

8 Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant’s Representations are likely to mislead
9 reasonable consumers. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge the following statements, *see*
10 FAC ¶¶ 111-112: (i) “#1 GYNECOLOGIST RECOMMENDED TAMPON BRAND; (ii)
11 “FREE OF PERFUME”; (iii) “FREE OF ELEMENTAL CHLORINE BLEACHING”;
12 (iv) “TAMPON FREE OF DYES”; and (v) “CLINICALLY TESTED GENTLE TO
13 SKIN.” Plaintiffs allege that these Representations mislead reasonable consumers who
14 could take those statements to mean that the Products are free from potentially harmful
15 elements and ingredients, including lead. FAC ¶¶ 113, 114.

16 The Court finds that the reasonable consumer could be misled into believing that
17 the Products are free of lead based on the Representations. In this case, representations
18 like “GYNECOLOGIST RECOMMENDED,” “FREE OF ELEMENTAL CHLORINE
19 BLEACHING,” and “CLINICALLY TESTED GENTLE TO SKIN” are much more
20 conceptually related to the idea that the Products are free from harmful substances, like
21 lead. *See Sebastian v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.*, No. 17-cv-442-WQH-JMA, 2017 WL
22 6497675, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2017) (“[T]he statements ‘simple formula’ and
23 ‘gentle’ are not mere puffery in the context of litigation about alleged misrepresentations
24 regarding the ingredients in baby wipes.”); *Trader Joe’s*, 2024 WL 1319725, at *1, 8
25 (defendant’s statements about the quality of the products, like “quality ingredients” and
26 “colors derived only from naturally available products,” could mislead a reasonable
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1 consumer to think that there would be no heavy metals in the products). In *Equal*
2 *Exchange*, the court rejected plaintiff’s allegation that certain statements on defendant’s
3 chocolate products, including “always small farmer grown,” would lead consumers to
4 believe that the “Products do not contain unsafe levels of toxins.” 2024 WL 1421971, at
5 *5. While the connection between being locally grown and being free from toxins is
6 attenuated, the connection here between the Representations and the suggestion of the
7 absence of lead is stronger. *See also Barnes v. Nat. Organics, Inc.*, 2022 WL 4283779, at
8 *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2022) (statements like “safe and natural dietary means” were
9 actionable misrepresentations on the presence of heavy metals). The Court here agrees
10 that a reasonable consumer could be misled into thinking there is no lead in the Products,
11 based on the Representations about the Products’ quality, health, and the absence of
12 certain additives.

13 Whether a business practice is deceptive is usually a question of fact that is not
14 appropriate for determination at the pleadings stage, so “in federal courts, dismissals of
15 UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims at the pleadings stage have ‘occasionally been upheld,’ but
16 such cases are ‘rare.’” *Whiteside*, 108 F.4th, 778 (quoting *Williams*, 552 F.3d at 939).
17 Thus, keeping in mind “the factual inquiry required to adequately assess the merits of the
18 reasonable consumer standard,” the Court denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss
19 Plaintiffs’ claims based on affirmative misrepresentations. *Chase*, 2018 WL 786743, at
20 *5.

21 2. Material omission

22 To support an omission theory, Plaintiffs must establish that Defendant had a duty
23 to disclose that the tampons allegedly contain lead. There are at least two different tests
24 to determine whether a defendant has a duty to disclose. *See Hammerling v. Google*
25 *LLC*, 615 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1085 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2022). Under one test, the
26 defendant only has a duty when either (1) the defect relates to an unreasonable safety
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1 hazard, or (2) the defect is material, “central to the product’s function,” and the plaintiff
2 alleges one of the four *LiMandri* factors.¹ *Id.* Under another approach, “the defendant
3 has a duty any time that a plaintiff alleges one of the following: (1) the defect relates to
4 an unreasonable safety hazard; (2) the defect is material and related to the product’s
5 central function; or (3) the presence of one of the four *LiMandri* factors.” *Id.* (citation
6 omitted). Because the Ninth Circuit and a majority of district courts have applied the first
7 approach, *id.*, this Court will do the same: Plaintiffs must allege that the defect relates to
8 an unreasonable safety hazard; or that the defect is material, it is central to the product’s
9 function, and at least one *LiMandri* factor is present.

10 In addition to the Rule 9(b) deficiencies regarding the lab testing outlined above,
11 Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that the presence of lead amounts to an
12 unreasonable safety hazard. As Defendant points out, there is no allegation that the
13 tampons even release lead, and the June 2024 study that Plaintiffs rely on cautions that
14 future research is needed to “determine whether metals can leach out of tampons and
15 cross the vaginal epithelium into systemic circulation.” Request for Judicial Notice, Ex.
16 2 at 9. Additionally, the FDA announced in December 2024 that its literature review “did
17 not identify safety concerns associated with tampon use and contaminant exposure.”
18 Notice of Supplemental Authority, Exhibit A, at 1. Although none of the studies actually
19 addressed “how much, if any, of the contaminants identified are released from the
20 tampon or absorbed through the vagina,” the FDA stated that it “continues to recommend
21 FDA-cleared tampons as a safe option for use as a menstrual product.” *Id.* In turn,

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24 ¹ The *LiMandri* factors are: (1) the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the
25 plaintiff; (2) the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the
26 plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; or (4) the
27 defendant makes partial representations while also suppressing some material facts.
LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal. App. 4th 326, 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).

1 Plaintiffs allege, without other evidence, that lead will be released from the tampons and
2 will “directly enter the bloodstream.” FAC ¶ 11; *see id.* ¶ 33. However, this contradicts
3 the June 2024 study Plaintiffs cite, and the Court “is not required to accept as true
4 conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the
5 complaint.” *Wright v. Oregon Metallurgical Corp.*, 360 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004).

6 Furthermore, even if the tampons released lead at the levels that Plaintiffs have
7 alleged that they do, Plaintiffs still fail to allege that the lead is “unreasonably hazardous
8 at the particular levels in the specific Products.” *Trader Joe’s*, 2024 WL 1319725, at
9 *11; *Rodriguez v. Mondelez Glob. LLC*, 703 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1210 (S.D. Cal. 2023),
10 *reconsideration denied*, No. 23-CV-00057-DMS-AHG, 2024 WL 1361892 (S.D. Cal.
11 Mar. 29, 2024) (motion to dismiss fraud-by-omission claims granted because Plaintiffs
12 did not plausibly allege defendant concealed an *unreasonable* safety hazard). In other
13 words, while Plaintiffs detail the harms posed by lead to human health in general and at
14 the Proposition 65 lead thresholds that trigger notice requirements, the FAC fails to
15 sufficiently allege that these potential harms are “unreasonably hazardous” at the
16 particular levels here. *Trader Joe’s*, 2024 WL 1319725, at *11.

17 Even under the second approach to determine whether a defendant has a duty to
18 disclose, Plaintiffs cannot succeed. They must sufficiently allege the materiality of the
19 defect, its centrality to the product’s function, and the presence of at least one *LiMandri*
20 factor. While Plaintiffs allege the existence of *LiMandri* factors, *see* Opposition at 18-19,
21 they do not allege facts for the other prongs. The Court therefore determines that
22 Plaintiffs have not established a duty to disclose upon which their omission theory can
23 stand.

24 The Court thereby dismisses without prejudice Plaintiffs’ UCL, FAL, and CLRA
25 omissions claims, and grants Plaintiffs leave to amend.

26 **F. Equitable claims**

1 1. Sonner

2 Plaintiffs seek restitution and injunctive relief under the UCL, FAC ¶ 175;
3 restitution, disgorgement, and injunctive relief under the FAL, FAC ¶ 202; and damages
4 and injunctive relief under the CLRA, FAC ¶¶ 223, 224. Defendant moves to dismiss the
5 equitable claims under the UCL, FAL, and the CLRA, arguing that Plaintiffs have not
6 alleged an inadequate remedy at law, based on *Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp.*, 971
7 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020). Mot. at 20. Plaintiffs oppose, arguing that they can plead
8 equitable relief in the alternative, citing to several post-*Sonner* district court cases. *See*
9 Opposition at 23.

10 In *Sonner*, the Ninth Circuit held that “traditional principles governing equitable
11 remedies in federal courts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply
12 when a party requests restitution under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity action.” 971
13 F.3d at 844. There, the consumer conceded that she sought “the same sum in equitable
14 restitution as ‘a full refund of the purchase price’—\$32,000,00—as she requested in
15 damages to compensate her for the same past harm.” *Id.* Accordingly, the court held that
16 a plaintiff must allege that she “lacks an adequate remedy at law before securing
17 equitable restitution for past harm under the UCL and CLRA.” *Id.*; *see, O’Shea v.*
18 *Littleton*, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974) (dismissing complaint that failed to establish the
19 basic requisites for the issuance of equitable relief).

20 District courts have held that this requirement to plead “inadequacy-of-law”
21 applies to equitable relief beyond restitution, including for injunctive relief claims. *Shay*
22 *v. Apple Inc.*, 2021 WL 1733385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2021) (collecting cases).
23 District courts, however, are far less in agreement on *Sonner*’s application to the pleading
24 stage. There is currently an “intra-circuit split” on whether courts may allow UCL claims
25 to proceed past pleading when other adequate remedies exist and on how “exact[ing] of a
26 standard *Sonner* imposes on plaintiffs who plead claims for equitable and legal claims at
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1 the pleading stage.” *Jeong v. Nexo Fin. LLC*, 2022 WL 174236, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
2 19, 2022) (citing *Byton N. Am. Co. v. Breitfeld*, 2020 WL 3802700, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
3 28, 2020)).

4 A number of district courts have concluded that *Sonner* does not preclude a
5 plaintiff, at this stage, from pleading equitable remedies in the alternative. *See Nacarino*
6 *v. Chobani, LLC*, 668 F. Supp. 3d 881, 895-97 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (denying dismissal of
7 restitution claim, even if it “may be revisited at a later stage”); *accord Yeomans v. World*
8 *Fin. Grp. Ins. Agency, Inc.*, 2022 WL 844152 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2022). Because
9 *Sonner* was decided at a later posture, it does not directly address what exactly a plaintiff
10 must allege at the pleading stage. *See also Carroll v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.*, 2022 WL
11 16860013, at *6 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 9, 2022) (“This Court will not deprive plaintiffs of their
12 claims without clearer direction from a higher court.”). Allowing claims to move forward
13 would also be consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which allows for
14 pleading in the alternative. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3) (a claim for relief must contain “a
15 demand for relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of
16 relief”); *see also Byton*, 2020 WL 3802700, at *9 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit’s general rule is
17 that plaintiffs may plead alternative claims, even if those claims are inconsistent.”).

18 That being said, Plaintiffs here plead no allegations that the legal remedies are
19 inadequate for the restitution or disgorgement that they seek under the UCL and FAL.
20 This warrants dismissal of those claims to the extent they seek restitution and/or
21 disgorgement. *See Scheibe v. Performance Enhancing Supplements, LLC*, 2024 WL
22 5444644, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2023) (allowing CLRA damages claim to move
23 forward while dismissing CLRA equitable relief claim because the complaint lacked any
24 mention of inadequate legal remedies).

25 At a minimum, Plaintiffs must plead inadequate legal remedies in the operative
26 pleading to allege claims for equitable relief under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA. They
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1 have shown this for the injunctive relief that they seek. *See* FAC ¶¶ 142-45, 157-60. But
2 because Plaintiffs have not alleged that legal remedies are inadequate for the
3 disgorgement and restitution remedies under the UCL and FAL, the Court grants the
4 Defendant’s motion to dismiss the UCL and FAL claims to the extent they seek these
5 forms of relief. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint to expressly
6 allege facts to support a claim that their remedies at law are inadequate.

7 2. Standing for injunctive relief

8 The Ninth Circuit in *Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark*, 889 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018),
9 held that “a previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an injunction
10 against false advertising or labeling, even though the consumer now knows or suspects
11 that the advertising was false at the time of the original purchase, because the consumer
12 may suffer an ‘actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’ threat of future
13 harm.” *Davidson*, 889 F.3d at 969 (citing *Summers v. Earth Island Inst.*, 555 U.S. 488,
14 493 (2009)). “Knowledge that the advertisement or label was false in the past does not
15 equate to knowledge that it will remain false in the future.” *Id.* If plaintiffs can establish
16 that they will be unable to rely on the product’s advertising or labeling in the future, so
17 will not purchase the product even if they want to; or that they might purchase the
18 product in the future, because they may reasonably but incorrectly assume the product
19 has changed, then plaintiffs can establish a future injury. *See id.* at 969-70.

20 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs still do not have standing for their injunctive relief
21 claims because this Court and others in the Circuit have held that courts “cannot impose a
22 mandatory injunction requiring a company to alter its products.” Mot. at 23-24 (quoting
23 *Renn v. Otay Lakes Brewery, LLC*, 2024 WL 331616, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2024)).
24 Defendant interprets the Plaintiffs’ statement that they would “like to purchase the
25 Products in the future if the Products do not contain lead,” to mean that Plaintiffs are
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1 (only) asking for an injunction that would force Defendant to change its Products to not
2 contain lead. Mot. at 23.

3 However, if the Court is construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the
4 Plaintiffs, it is clear that the FAC gives rise to multiple “tenable injunctive remedies.”
5 Opposition at 25. Plaintiffs certainly will not buy the Products if they contain lead, but
6 the key point – and the thing that constitutes the injury for standing – is that Plaintiffs
7 *won’t know* if the Products contain lead or not without an injunction of some kind. *See*
8 FAC ¶¶ 144, 159. Plaintiffs allege that they are not “able to rely on the labeling and
9 advertising of the products for their truth, and thus [are] unable to determine whether
10 [they] can purchase the Products in the future,” even though they would like to purchase
11 them. *Id.* ¶¶ 143, 158; *see Davidson*, 889 F.3d at 971-72 (plaintiffs face injury when they
12 are “unable to rely on [Defendant’s] representation of its products in deciding whether or
13 not [they] should purchase the product in the future”). Several forms of injunctive relief
14 could redress this injury. In the Complaint itself, the form of injunctive relief most
15 directly alluded to is “enjoin[ing] [Defendant] from failing to disclose the presence of
16 lead”; in other words, enjoining Defendant to disclose, on its advertising or labeling of
17 their Products, whether there is lead or not. FAC ¶¶ 144, 159. Plaintiffs do not seek – or
18 do not *only* seek – an injunction that would mandate Defendant to change the content of
19 their Products.


20 Plaintiffs’ allegation that they will have no idea of determining whether the
21 Products contain lead or not constitutes a “threatened injury certainly impending,” and
22 thereby establishes standing for their injunctive relief claims. *See Davidson*, 889 F.3d at
23 972.

24 CONCLUSION

1 Based on the reasoning above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
2 Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave to amend and
3 DIRECTS Plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint within 25 days of this order.

4 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

5 Dated: February 13, 2025

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7 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel
8 United States District Judge
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